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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATIENT IN ILLINOIS
Walter L. Oblinger*
T HE 71ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at the suggestion of the Illinois
State Medical Society, enacted legislation designed to afford a
measure of protection to disclosures made to physicians by their
patients. The Act is as follows:
No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any in-
formation he may have acquired in attending any patient in
a professional character, necessary 'to enable him profession-
ally to serve such patient, except only (1) in trials for homi-
cide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immedi-
ate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all mental illness
inquiries, (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against the physi-
cian for malpractice, (4) with the expressed consent of the
patient, or in case of his death or disability, of his personal
representative or other person authorized to sue for personal
injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life,
health, or physical condition, (5) in all civil suits brought by
or against the patient, his personal representative, a benefi-
ciary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or admin-
istrator of his estate wherein the patient's physical or mental
condition is an issue, (6) upon an issue as to the validity of
a document as a will of the patient, or (7) in any criminal
action where the charge is either murder by abortion, at-
tempted abortion or abortion.'
* The Author is General Counsel for the Illinois State Medical Society, Spring-
field, Illinois. He received his LL.B. degree from Chicago-Kent College of Law
in 1939. Employed as Special Agent of the F.B.I., 1939-1951. Has written articles
on Medico-Legal subjects for the Illinois Medical Journal. Editor of the Spring-
field Newsletter, a medico-legal and legislative periodical. Director of Legislative
Activities for the Illinois State Medical Society. Member of Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law Committee, Illinois State Bar Association.
This article previously appeared in the Illinois Medical Journal, Vol. 117, No. 3,
March, 1960, under the title: "Now Disclosures Made to the Physician Are Privi-
leged."
' Laws 1959, Vol. 2, p. 1940, H. B. 1280; Ill. Rev. Stats. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 5.1.
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The first thing to bear in mind is that the privilege belongs
exclusively to the patient and may not be waived by the physician.2
As written, the prohibition against disclosure by the physician may
be waived only under one of the seven exceptions enumerated in
the statute.
A review of existing statutes in other states discloses that the
privilege as it exists elsewhere contains one or more of the ex-
ceptions enumerated in the Illinois statute.3 Of course, the priv-
ilege did not exist at common law.4  The only privilege that did
exist at common law was that between attorney and client,5 the
purpose being to encourage the employment of professional ad-
visers by persons in need of legal services and to promote absolute
freedom of consultation by removing all fears on the part of the
client that his attorney might be compelled to disclose in court
the communications of the client or other information developed by
the attorney during the course of his representation." Practically
all of the states have statutes embodying this common law rule.
2 McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence (West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
1954), § 105, p. 216. Professor McCormick points out: ". . . the rule which ex-
cludes disclosures to physicians is not a rule of incompetency of evidence serving
the end of protecting the adverse party against unreliable or prejudicial testimony.
It is a rule of privilege protecting the extrinsic interest of the patient and designed
to promote health not truth. It encourages free disclosure in the sick-room by pre-
venting such disclosure in the courtroom. The patient is the person to be encouraged
and he is the holder of the privilege" See also, Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940),
Vol. 8, § 2386, p. 828, and a Note, "Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of
the Physician-Patient Relationship," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 383 (1952).
3 Statutes are compiled in Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2380, p.
803, footnote 5, and in De Witt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and
Patient (Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield, Illinois, 1958), Appendix, p. 447.
4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2380, p. 802; Cleary Handbook of
Illinois Evidence (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1956), § 4.16, p. 56; Mc-
Cormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 101, p. 211; Model Code of Evidence(American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 1942), Foreword by Edmund M. Morgan,
at page 28 and Rule 221, comment at page 161.
In the Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Trials 573 (1776), when a doc-
tor raised the question before Lord Mansfield whether a physician was required
to disclose professional confidences, the Chief Justice made it clear: "If a surgeon
was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he would be guilty of a breach
of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give that information in a court ofjustice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed
to him as any indiscretion whatever."
5 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2290; p. 547 (history of the privi-
lege). Illinois clearly recognizes the privilege in the lawyer-client relationship.
Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 153 N. E. 740 (1926).
6 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2291, p. 550 (policy of the privilege).
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FIRST STATUTE
The first state to enact a statute protecting disclosures made to
a physician appears to be New York, which in 1828 adopted lan-
guage that served as a model for many other states. It provided:
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall
be allowed to disclose any information which he may have
acquired in attending any patient, in a professional character,
and which information was necessary to enable him to pre-
scribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him,
as a surgeon.7
Of course, the purpose of the statute was to encourage the pa-
tient, as a matter of public policy, to make full disclosures to his
physician so that he could be properly and fully treated.' Thus,
it would appear, that the legislature decided that public policy
required that its citizens be free to seek treatment for their in-
juries and ailments and that this consideration was more impor-
tant than the need to get at the truth in a lawsuit.
With the passage of this type of legislation, many unconsidered
problems arose which worked to the disadvantage of the patient.
Other problems arose wherein the needs of justice outweighed the
need for absolute privacy of communication between physician and
patient. Hence, the legislatures began to enact exceptions to the
absolute privilege.
7 N. Y. Stats. 1827-28 (Published in 1829), Vol. II, Part III, Ch. 7, Tit. 3, art.
eight, § 73, p. 406. Another early Act, widely copied, is the California Code of
Civil Procedure of 1872, § 1881, par. 4: "A licensed physician or surgeon can-
not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any
information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe or act for the patient."
For a list of the states which have enacted this legislative privilege in some
form, see footnote 3, ante. States maintaining the common law position denying
any privilege for information disclosed to medical practitioners are listed in Chafee,
"Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?" 52 Yale L. J. 607 (194-3).
8 McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 101, p. 211 and § 108, p. 221;
Model Code of Evidence, Foreword by Edmund M. Morgan, p. 28.
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PATIENT, PHYSICIAN, PUBLIC SERVED
As summarized in the Illinois statute, the patient's best inter-
ests are served under exception 2, where the patient is in need of
mental treatment and his physician is the best person available
to inform the court. Again, under exception 4, it seemed wise to
permit the patient to expressly waive his privilege or his executor
or personal representative to sue upon a policy of insurance or on
a personal injury claim where he was either dead or under some
form of legal disability. Exception 5, as originally drawn and
submitted to the legislature, stipulated that the privilege was im-
pliedly waived when the patient brought a civil suit wherein his
physical or mental condition was an issue and the physician's tes-
timony was relevant to that issue. The legislature, in its wisdom,
however, insisted that the ends of justice required that the physi-
cian testify also in those cases where suit was brought against the
patient and his physical or mental condition was an issue and
struck the relevancy test, thereby leaving it exclusively to the
courts to decide on which matters the physician should testify.
One of the problems sought to be overcome, i. e., one which
caused trouble to courts in other states where the privilege existed,
was the lack of expert medical testimony in will contests. It would
appear to be in the best interest of the patient that his physician
be permitted to testify as 'to his mental condition at the time he
executed the document sought to be admitted in probate as his will.
This, then, was made an exception to the privilege under exception
6. Exceptions 1 and 7 were enacted as a matter of public policy
so that in cases of murder, murder by abortion or abortion, the
courts could have the benefit of medical testimony. The purpose
of exception 3 is to permit the physician to protect himself in
cases of malpractice by permitting him to testify, produce medical
records, or use other medical evidence in his defense. One author-
ity 9 flatly states that if this exception did not exist, a physician
would absolutely be at the mercy of an unscrupulous patient. Thus
9 De Witt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, p. 251.
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exception 3 attempts to prevent the use of the courts to reach an
unjust result and may be justified on the basis of public policy.
That a need existed for this type of legislation has been well
known to the medical profession for many years. Two of the prin-
cipal problems have been, (1) the disclosure of admissions made-
by patients to physicians in lawsuits, for example, in divorce and
separate maintenance actions, and (2) disclosure of admissions
made by patients to physicians involving ailments not directly
related to the lawsuit at hand.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW
In the first instance, several cases have arisen in Illinois, as
illustrated by one case in the Circuit Court of Cook County,10
wherein the plaintiff sought to question his wife's psychiatrist in a,
suit brought for alienation of affections. The physician claimed
that any disclosures made were privileged. The court, without
benefit of enabling legislation, sought to give the privilege status
and upheld the physician and refused to permit him to answer."
The case was not appealed, however, and the Supreme Court of
Illinois has never had an opportunity to pass upon the question.
If the problem had been presented to the Supreme Court, there
is no question that it would have overruled the lower court and
followed the common law rule.
It might be observed that the psychiatrist occupies a position
quite similar to that of the attorney 12 in consultations involving
problems that evidence themselves in the form of neuroses and
psychoses. Both the lawyer and the psychiatrist must receive
10 Binder v. Ruvell, Civil Docket (Law) 52C 2535, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, June 24, 1952. See note on this case, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 384.
11 The file, Civil Docket (Law) 52 C 2535, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illi-
nois, contains a nine page statement of Trial Judge, Harry M. Fisher, setting forth
reasons for upholding the privilege.
12 Judge Fisher, in the trial court memorandum in the case of Binder v. Ruvell,
ante, footnotes 10 and 11, likened the position of the psychiatrist with his patient
to that of the priest-penitent relationship. Wigmore also supports this privilege(priest-penitent), Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2396, p. 850, while
opposing the physician-patient privilege, § 2285, p. 532.
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from the patient information which may involve him in illegal,
immoral, or other activity that may be detrimental to the patient
if the information is made public or is disclosed to unauthorized
persons. That the psychiatrist should be free to delve into all
facets of the patient's life in an effort to solve his medical prob-
lems would appear to be self-evident. 13 All too frequently however,
the problems confronting the patient have legal ramifications, as
in the case of extra-marital relationships. It was intended, and it
is hoped, that the statute will serve to protect the psychiatrist-
patient relationship and render the psychiatrist immune from
court inquiry, saving exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 above.
Inasmuch as exception 5 provides that the issue before the
court in the civil action must be one "wherein the patient's
physical or mental condition is an issue," it would appear that
the psychiatrist would not be permitted to testify in the divorce
or separate maintenance situation or in other actions where the
admission or disclosure is not directly related to the cause of
action. However, it would appear that the psychiatrist would
be subject to testifying in causes of action wherein the cause of
action is on an issue directly affecting the patient's mental or
physical condition, for example, cases involving traumatic neu-
rosis, or other neuroses growing out of injury or wrongs com-
mitted against the patient.
INCOMPLETE SOLUTION
Insofar as disclosures made to physicians involving ailments
not directly related to the lawsuit is concerned, it would appear
that this statute falls short of complete solution. The classic case
in point is the case involving a lawsuit brought by the patient for
damages for injuries suffered through negligence of the defend-
ant. The plaintiff claims that his back ailment or his broken
leg was directly caused by the negligence of the defendant. The
13 Extended discussion in Note, 47 Nw U. L. Rev. 384 (1952), and Guttmacher
and Weihofen, "Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient,"
28 Tod. L. J. 32 (1952).
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defendant, during the course of pre-trial discovery, seeks to ob-
tain the complete medical history of the patient, which includes
complete recovery from venereal disease, no ill effects being
observable or demonstrable.
If the defendant is permitted to bring out this history, the
lawsuit may have to be abandoned, since the disclosure may re-
sult in unfavorable personal publicity, marital difficulties, etc.
To permit the doctor to testify under these circumstances would
certainly prejudice the plaintiff and might prevent recovery on
a meritorious claim. However, not to permit the physician to tes-
tify might prevent the defendant from obtaining a medical his-
tory related to the injury, thereby resulting in a miscarriage
of justice. Further, it appears that the problem, whether a par-
ticular medical history might have a bearing on the injury, is
primarily a medical one.
Just how far the courts will go in the search for the truth
in this situation is speculative. 4 Regardless of the form of the
statute, it is probably safe to say that the courts will jealously
guard their right to determine what is relevant and material, and
that they probably will permit testimony on both sides before
ruling on the question of submitting the matter to the jury.
That the statute has created some problems is not unexpected.
The first problem is whether or not the physician is precluded
from asserting his lien for medical services under a new statute5
also passed by the 71st General Assembly. For the reasons out-
lined in a previous article, 6 it would appear that the physician
may comply with the so-called Physician's Lien Act and furnish
information concerning the injury, treatment, and medical his-
14 Two authorities delineate this area of speculation. In the Foreword to the
Model Code of Evidence, at page 7, Edmund M. Morgan says: "If a privilege to
suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits should be sharply determined
so as to coincide with the limits of the benefits it creates." Wigmore, Evidence
(3d Ed., 1940), Vol. 8, § 2285, p. 531: "The injury that would inure to the rela-
tion by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."
15 Laws 1959, Vol. 2, p. 2205, S. B. 1001; Ill. Rev. Stats. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 82,
§ 101.1 et seq.
16 Oblinger, "The Physician's Lien," 117 Ill. Med. Journal 81 (Feb., 1960).
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tory as related to him by the patient, provided the same appears
on the doctor's medical records.
Another problem is whether the notations made on the medi-
cal records of the patient in a hospital fall within the purview
of the privilege. Attention is called to the case of Newman v.
Blom,'17 wherein the court in upholding the privilege, said:
The policy of the statute is to provide for great freedom of
disclosure by a patient to his physician, for the patient is
often in no position to know what disclosures may or may
not be necessary for his proper treatment. . . . We [have
also held] that the statute should receive a liberal construc-
tion designed to carry out its manifest purpose to make con-
sultation by a patient with his physician entirely confidential
and free from anticipation or fear that this confidence will
be broken by the examination of the physician, directly or
indirectly, as a witness in some legal proceeding. Clearly,
then, such a statute is intended to cover any information
gathered from the patient and placed in a record by an at-
tending, consulting, or treating physician, whether done in-
tentionally, willfully, or under a law requiring its preserva-
tion. It is our conclusion that any such information placed
upon such hospital records should be and is covered under
[the statute] as privileged to the same extent that the knowl-
edge and information of the examining or treating physician
is privileged."'
Whether Illinois will follow the law as enunciated by the Iowa
Supreme Court remains to be seen. 9
TESTIMONY FOR HOMICIDE VICTIMS
Another problem with interesting legal sidelights involves
the construction of the language in exception 1. Note that the
physician is free to testify in homicide cases but that his testi-
17 249 Ia. 836, 89 N. W. (2d) 349 (1958).
Is Newman v. Blom, 249 Ia. 836, 843, 844, 89 N.W. (2d) 349, 354, 355 (1958).
19 In other jurisdictions, the cases are divided on this point. See, McCormick,
Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 104 at pp. 214-5 and § 290 at pp. 609 and 613.
Compare, Frederick v. Federal Life Insurance Company, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 585,
57 P. (2d) 235 (1936), noted in 25 Cal. L. R. 108 (1936).
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mony is limited to disclosures relating "directly to the fact or
immediate circumstances of the homicide." It would appear that
this poses no problem for the physician conducting an autopsy
on the deceased; a private relationship between physician and
patient never existed and, of course, the privilege never arises.
Furthermore, autopsies done under these circumstances would
undoubtedly be ordered by the coroner and are provided for by
statute.2" Insofar as the physician treating the deceased prior
to death is concerned, it would appear that he could testify ob-
jectively on the cause of death.
Would he be permitted to testify as to a dying declaration
wherein the victim names the defendant as his assailant? 2 It is
generally held by the courts that the defendant in a criminal
prosecution may not invoke the privilege of the victim and thus
exclude relevant evidence which the victim's physician is in a
position to give. No confidential relationship existed between the
physician and the defendant; hence, no privilege exists.22
In the case of Davenport v. State,23 the defendant was con-
victed of manslaughter. Physicians who had attended the vic-
tim testified for the state, over objection by the defendant, on
the nature of the victim's wound, treatment given, and the cause
of death. There was no evidence showing consent or waiver of
the privilege by the victim. A majority of the court, in a split
decision, held that the defendant could not claim the privilege
of the victim; therefore, testimony of the physicians was ad-
missible.24
20 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 31, § 10.2. See note, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 390.
21 Since this situation seems to be covered by exception in the statute, no problem
should arise.
22 See De Witt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, ante,
footnote 9, p. 50 (discussion and footnote cases).
23 143 Miss. 121, 108 So. 433, 45 A. L. R. 1348 (1926).
24 The Mississippi statute involved, read: "All communications made to a phy-
sician or surgeon by a patient under his charge or by one seeking professional
advice, are hereby declared to be privileged, and such physician or surgeon shall
uot be required to disclose the same in any legal proceeding, except at the instance
of the patient." The three judges who dissented indicated that the statute's word-
ing, "in any legal proceeding," applied to criminal prosecutions.
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The court, in the hypothetical situation above, might hold
that the presence of the physician at the deathbed was incidental
and that the victim's purpose and intention in making the state-
ment was not for the purpose of being treated but to see justice
done.
TESTIMONY FOR DEFENDANTS
A greater problem is posed for the physician who treats the
defendant. Could a psychiatrist, for example, be compelled to
testify on the homicidal tendencies of his patient when his opinion
is based on observations and conferences extending over a con-
siderable period of time prior to the act? What about admissions
in the nature of a confession occurring after the fact? Likewise,
there would seem to be a problem in the factual situation where
the defendant expresses hostility to the victim and makes state-
ments indicating that the defendant intended to do bodily harm
to the victim. This might be construed to be a disclosure directly
relating to the fact of homicide. What about observations as to
the defendant's state of mind or physical characteristics upon
which the physician might reasonably conclude that this was a
dangerous man but without any indication that he intended to do
harm to any particular person, especially the victim? These are
questions the courts must pass upon.2 5 The courts might very well
exclude any testimony not directly related to the fact or to the
immediate circumstances of the homicide disclosed to the physi-
cian in his capacity as a physician for the purpose of treatment.
Exception 7 does not appear to be limited in any way. It
simply provides that in criminal cases where the charge is either
murder by abortion, or abortion, that the privilege does not exist.
In these cases, then, it would appear that the physician must
testify as to any facts he may have competent to prove the charge.
25 Some of the questions are answered in an Editorial Note, citing cases, in Se-
lected Writings on the Law of Evidence and Trial, edited by William T. Fryer(West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1957), pp. 258-9.
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CONCLUSION
Aside from the protection to the psychiatrist-patient rela-
tionship, just what has the statute accomplished? First of all,
the principle of privileged communication for the physician-
patient relationship has been established. Secondly, the law has
recognized the principle of medical ethics against the disclosure
of matters received by the physician in the very private relation-
ship between him and his patient. Thirdly, the physician is pro-
hibited from making any disclosure in most legal situations in-
cluding all criminal matters except murder or abortion, unless
the privilege is waived through some conduct of the patient as
enumerated in the statute.
